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The consultative referendum held on June 23, 2013, showed that a majority of British voters are in 
favour of leaving the EU. Markets reacted and adapted, and politics made the fi rst steps towards a 
UK outside the EU and an EU without Britain. This paper looks at the expected effects of Brexit 
in different fi elds: political and social effects, consequences for production and trade, and fi nancial 
and fi scal effects. It then presents the institutional process of leaving the EU, stressing its indetermi-
nacy, and considers the fi rst steps undertaken so far. It concludes that the EU negotiation position is 
weak because of its internal problems and calls for the priority given in reforming the EU.
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1. BREXIT: ONE OF MANY CASES?
The standard view in the European Union so far was one of continuous enlarge-
ment and integration. The Union reached the respectable number of 28 member 
countries on July 1, 2013, with the membership of Croatia. There are presently 
five candidate countries (Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Turkey) 
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and two “potential candidate countries” (Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo), 
which have the prospect to join the EU “in the medium to long term”.
However, during the last few years, the EU itself and various countries started 
to take positions and moves that showed that the enlargement process may en-
counter problems. Turkey applied to become a member of the then European 
Economic Community (EEC) already in 1987. Turkey was accepted as a candi-
date country only 12 years later in 1999. The accession negotiations started in 
2005. This was a time-consuming and controversial process. The advantages of 
Turkey’s membership for the EU were recognised in different aspects: Turkey is 
a strategically important member of NATO and was at the time taking an arduous 
path to democracy and development. It was thought that EU membership could 
politically and socially stabilise a strategically important country, with economic 
and political benefits for the EU. Turkey is also a Muslim country and its mem-
bership could have created benefits for the EU in its relations with the Muslim 
world. At the same time, this very fact was of concern to the EU for the political 
implication and a possible source of internal strains.
Economic concerns for Turkey’s membership were felt primarily in South Eu-
ropean countries, whose agricultural production overlapped with Turkey’s. These 
countries and other countries with disadvantaged regions felt that Turkey’s mem-
bership would divert European funds to their disadvantage, particularly the struc-
tural funds. After 2004, this concern was also felt in the new member countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe. The demographic dynamics of the country were also 
important, which were bound to soon make Turkey the most populous in the EU, 
overtaking Germany, which would have important consequences in the EU gov-
ernance. Given the contrast of interests within the EU, the EU itself took the role 
of slowing down and virtually derail the accession process. Some concessions 
were made in 2015–2016 to ensure Turkey’s support in the management of the 
immigration crisis. But these were mostly financial in nature, while Turkey’s re-
quest of visa liberalisation and a visa-free regime for its citizens is still pending.
Less noticed was the reverse case: a candidate country refusing to become a 
member country. In March 2015, the government of Iceland requested that “Iceland 
should not be regarded as a candidate country for EU membership”. This request 
ended a process that had started on July 16, 2009, when Iceland applied to join 
the European Union. Formal negotiations began on July 27, 2010, and the country 
gained candidate status in June 17, 2010. Iceland never became a member country 
of the European Union and the country’s attitude to EU integration soon cooled. 
There were different reasons for this, but national interests (“Iceland’s interests are 
better served outside the European Union”) over such critically important issues as 
fishing regulation played a prominent role. Understandably, this took place after 
Iceland overcame the dramatic financial and bank crisis of 2008–2011.
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As soon as September 13, 2013, after a new centre-right government took of-
fice following elections, the Icelandic government dissolved its accession team 
and de facto suspended its application to join the EU. This took place despite 
the deep integration of the Icelandic economy with the EU economy. Iceland 
is a member of various European initiatives such as the Schengen Area and the 
Dublin regulation on asylum policy, and participates (with no voting right) in a 
number of EU agencies and programmes. The country is also a member of the 
European Economic Area (EEA) and participates in the single market. Indeed, 
two-thirds of Iceland’s foreign trade is with EU member states. Also, the legal 
system is strongly integrated and a significant number of the EU’s laws are ap-
plied in Iceland.
Iceland’s backing out was the first serious reversal in the EU enlargement poli-
cy. Due to the country’s tiny size, which would have made it the smallest member 
country in terms of population, this setback went nearly unnoticed and its politi-
cal meaning was disregarded. It was much less noticed than the politically more 
important and debated case of the prospective membership of Turkey.
There were other cases of backing out in EU history. Norway applied to be-
come a member in 1969 and signed the Treaties of Accession to the European 
Communities in 1972, based on an overwhelming parliamentary majority. How-
ever, Norwegian membership in the European Community was rejected in a Sep-
tember 1972 referendum. Following the outcome, Norway declined to become 
a member. Another referendum on joining the European Union was held in No-
vember 1994. The denial won again, albeit with a strict margin.
Denmark presented an original situation of some interest for Brexit and the un-
easy position of Scotland.1 Denmark formally applied to join European Economic 
Community on August 10, 1961, a day after the British applied. Since France 
vetoed British membership and given the strict economic links between Denmark 
and Britain, Denmark postponed its membership until January 1, 1973, when 
Britain and Ireland finally joined. A referendum supported this decision with a 
nearly two-thirds majority. Greenland, a part of the Danish Realm, joined the 
European Economic Community with Denmark. However, Greenland took soon 
advantage of the home rule that Denmark had granted to Greenland in 1979 and 
in a referendum held in 1982 voted to leave the Community. Greenland withdrew 
from the EEC, but without seceding from Denmark in 1985. In another referen-
dum in 2008, an overwhelming three-quarters majority of voters were in favour 
of the Self-Government Act. The act, effective since June 21, 2009, gradually 
transferred to the Greenlandic government a set of important additional respon-
1  The Scottish Parliament and Goverment have announced that they may hold a new referen-
dum for leaving Britain and possibly join the EU in case Brexit goes through.
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sibility in different fields (police, judicial system and various legal competences, 
company law, financial regulation and supervision, aliens and border controls, 
and others). The Danish government retains control of foreign affairs, defence, 
and monetary policy.
And then came Brexit.
The next three sections review the political and social effects of Brexit, the 
consequences for production and trade, and financial and fiscal effects, respec-
tively. Section 5 deals with the indeterminacy of the institutional process of leav-
ing the EU and Section 6 considers the first steps undertaken so far. Section 7 
concludes.
2. THE EFFECTS OF BREXIT: POLITICAL AND SOCIAL EFFECTS
Brexit is not the first problem with EU membership, but it is certainly the most im-
portant and alarming for the significance of the country, its potential consequenc-
es, and the complex and critical situation that the EU is going through. Aware of 
the problems and dangers looming around and within the EU, the incoming new 
President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker announced in its 
political guidelines that enlargement is to be stopped for five years.2 However, 
Brexit did not take place according to the vision and aims of the Commission 
or the Council, but against these and upon the initiative of a powerful member 
country. Brexit is the first case of EU shrinkage upon the initiative of an impor-
tant member country. Great Britain is a country whose vision of integration was 
often in contrast with that of the founding members and a country which obtained 
2  “When it comes to enlargement, I fully recognise that this has been an historic success that 
brought peace and stability to our continent. However, the Union and our citizens now need 
to digest the addition of 13 Member States in the past 10 years. The EU needs to take a break 
from enlargement so that we can consolidate what has been achieved among the 28. This is 
why, under my Presidency of the Commission, ongoing negotiations will continue, and nota-
bly the Western Balkans will need to keep a European perspective, but no further enlargement 
will take place over the next five years” (Juncker 2014: 16). And again, in his Statement in 
the European Parliament plenary session ahead of the vote held in Strasbourg on October 
22, 2014, President Juncker stressed: “We must not let those waiting at the door think that it 
might open in the next five years. Of course, the enlargement negotiations will continue with 
the same vigour, the same drive, the same commitment as in the past. And I would like to 
send a message to the candidate countries for accession to the European Union that, yes, the 
negotiations will be speeded up if necessary, but it is not realistic to think that they could be 
successfully completed before 2019” (Juncker 2014: 35).
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an especially favourable treatment.3 Yet its withdrawal is a heavy blow to the EU. 
Could this start a “counter-enlargement” process?
The EU project is apparently not as appealing as it once was. Is this the sign of 
a deep, structural, irreversible crisis? Or is it a sign of prevailing opportunism by 
some countries, which believe that they cannot get the support they obtained so 
far from the EU, or is it an attempt to blackmail the EU to attain more favourable 
conditions? Is this the final proof that the ideals that led to the process of Euro-
pean integration are dead and that only interests, mainly national interests, govern 
participation in the European integration?
Brexit is different. This is the first case of an EU member country to hold a 
referendum on EU membership in which the majority of the voters supported 
leaving the EU. There certainly was much populism, misjudgement, and political 
incompetence by various British politicians and the government. Perhaps the Eu-
ropean Union favoured the outcome by showing itself to be ready to grant Britain 
favourable concessions beyond the reasonable. This perhaps suggested that tough 
negotiation and credible exit threats can grant unilateral advantages.
Undoubtedly, Brexit represents a major political blow to the EU and the inte-
gration process, a blow that could have long-lasting, severe consequences if not 
properly managed.4 Is it also an economic and institutional blow?
Britain has traditionally had an uneasy relation to and with the EU. Three is-
sues were fundamental to its membership and participation in the EU: (a) the size 
of the unified market and trade, where much of its economic and financial interest 
is concentrated; (b) the intent to slow down and govern the financial unification 
of the continent that could jeopardise the dominance of the City; (c) to prevent 
the continent unifying its foreign and military policy and taking an independent 
stance, possibly contrary to British interests. The British marriage with the EU 
was certainly one of convenience, not of ideals, led by traditional British pragma-
tism. Added to this, behind the uneasy British situation and conflicting role, there 
are deep systemic and institutional differences, as comparative economics and 
the literature on the variety of capitalisms has abundantly highlighted.
3  “A new Settlement for the United Kingdom within the European Union” (European Council 
2016a) is the latest, broader special treatment that Great Britain gained to stay in the EU. After 
the 23 June referendum, this Agreement that was reached at the European Council on 18–19 
February 2016, “will now not take effect and ceases to exist. There will be no renegotiation” 
(Schulz et al. 2016).
4  “Brexit would not just have significant consequences for the UK but also for the rest of the 
European Union; … in so many ways, the future of democracy and sovereignty, of security 
and prosperity, in Europe is at stake. … The Brexit referendum will be a watershed moment in 
post-war history” (Gow – Meyer 2016).
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Britain consistently opposed the deepening of the EU project and maximised 
its advantages (common market, open finances, fiscal freedom, British contribu-
tion to the EU budget, and allocations from the EU budget), while blocking or 
weakening any serious integration process in critical areas (EU budget, fiscal 
unification, common currency and the role of the ECB, a stronger role for the 
European Commission, common foreign and military policy).
While the British position was led by national interests, it would be unfair to 
conclude that the outcome for the EU was negative. Although the British position 
caused problems, it also contributed importantly to developing a set of rules and 
policies that benefited the entire Union. Most analyses find that EU regulations, 
although cumbersome, do not restrain business, trade or finance, or impose partic-
ular costs upon economic activity. This outcome is also one of the merits of Great 
Britain’s participation in defining these rules. However, it is true that on occasion, 
the EU mismanaged important issues, which caused problems and costs also to 
member countries, the latest being the mismanagement of immigration waves.
On the political and social side it will be important to see whether Brexit con-
tributes to further alienating citizens in other countries from the EU and increas-
ing the danger of further withdrawals, or whether it creates a stronger support for 
the EU.5 The first post-Brexit social and political indirect evidence suggest that 
the latter is perhaps the case. Confronted with the real danger of an EU devolu-
tion or even disruption, European citizens may start to consider the value of such 
achievements as the borderless EU or even the euro. However, much will depend 
on the final outcome of Brexit and on what will happen within the UK, particu-
larly in Scotland.
Perhaps more important in practical terms will be to see what the influence 
of Brexit will be on the uneasy relation between the federalist perspective of the 
EU and the inter-governmental practice. For the time being, it is national govern-
ments that assumed the most active role in managing Brexit. However, it is the 
European Commission that should lead negotiations and a new officer in charge 
of the EU’s Brexit negotiations was appointed in the person of Michel Barnier 
for this purpose.6 Barnier is generally considered to be a tough negotiator and 
his appointment is considered to be an anti-British move on par with the British 
appointment of David Davis, a supporter of the leave campaign, as the Secretary 
5  The President of the ECB, Mario Draghi (2016) is particularly aware of this danger: “The 
more recent years of the European project have been characterized …by growing dissatisfac-
tion. This was expressed perhaps most clearly in the referendum on 23 June, when the people 
of the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union.”
6  According to a press release by the European Commission (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-16-2652_it.htm), Michel Barnier was appointed by the President of the European 
Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker as Chief Negotiator on July 27, 2016. He will report 
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of State responsible for the work of the Department for Exiting the European 
Union.7 Barnier entered office on October 1. The outcome for the management of 
EU-27 is still largely unpredictable.
3. ECONOMIC EFFECTS: PRODUCTION AND TRADE
Great Britain is an important trade partner for the other EU member countries. It 
is also the home of productive activities that are important for other EU countries, 
very active in foreign direct investments both as a recipient and as an investor, 
and the European headquarter of transnational companies (in particular from the 
United States, Japan, and China) which produce also for the EU market.
Membership in the EU has both created and diverted trade for its member 
countries, including the UK. It is obviously to be expected that the consequences 
of Brexit will be similar up to a point, yet reversed. However, what this actually 
means depends on a host of factors, including the outcome of negotiations be-
tween the EU and the UK, and the particular content of the new bilateral agree-
ments, the attitude of third countries to the British intent to reach new agree-
ments, the prevailing economic climate and the perception that markets will have 
of the consequences of Brexit, and how strictly EU principles (in particular, the 
free movement of people) are accepted by Britain as a condition to keep its access 
to the common market.
Trade relations between Britain, the EU, and third countries were heavily in-
fluenced by the international economic crisis and Britain has a sizeable trade 
deficit with the EU. UK trade dropped in 2009. There was a steady growth of 
both imports and exports until 2012, after which imports remained initially rela-
tively stable and then increased, peaking in Q2 of 2016, while exports peaked in 
Q2 of 2013.
Until 2011, UK exports to both the EU and third countries increased rapidly 
year after year, and exports to the EU were significantly more important than ex-
ports outside the EU. Then, in 2012, exports to the EU contracted abruptly, while 
exports outside the EU continued to grow. Between 2012 and 2013, a period of 
slight decrease in British exports in value terms, the two directions of exports 
were roughly on the same level. However, in 2015, exports to the EU fell signifi-
directly to the President and will have at his disposal the best Commission experts. He will 
be advised by a group of Directors-General dealing with the issues relevant to the negotia-
tions. Barnier will be ranked at the Director-General level.
7  This Department has a staff of over 180 in London, plus the expertise of over 120 officials in 
Brussels, plus the support from other government departments (Davis 2016).
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cantly to the level of 2010, while exports outside the EU increased again. Since 
2015, British exports outside the EU are significantly higher than exports to the 
EU, while imports from the EU continue to be more important than from third 
countries (R&C 2016). With this, Britain is one of the least integrated countries 
of the EU.8
Centre for European Reform (CER) uses a gravity model based on the Univer-
sity of Groningen’s World Input–Output Database to assess the extent of econom-
ic integration between the UK and the EU (Springford et al. 2016). The calcula-
tion considers both Britain’s exports to the EU and the supply chains providing 
intermediate goods and services to exporters. The share of UK output sold to the 
EU amounted to 9.8% in 2011, much higher than the corresponding share sold to 
the United States (3.4%) or China (1%).
More important is the share of Britain’s services exports, including the share 
of services provided by domestic firms to exporting companies. These include 
in particular business and financial services, which account for about one-third 
of Britain’s total services exports and generate about two-thirds of the overall 
services surplus. This surplus is important for financing the UK deficit on the 
trade of goods (Gros 2016). The share of services exported to the EU amounts 
to two-fifths of the UK output of such services (compared to 17% to the US and 
10% to BRIC countries). This UK advantage is likely to remain also following 
Brexit, both thanks to the City’s advantages and specialisation, and the possibility 
to create subsidiaries within the EU.
The UK’s proximity to the rest of Europe certainly explains part of the integra-
tion. The CER gravity model allows quantifying that Britain’s EU membership 
has boosted its trade in goods with other member countries by 55%. There is no 
evidence that Britain’s trade with the rest of the world has been constrained by 
its EU membership.
The importance of economic relations with Britain is not uniform for indi-
vidual EU member countries. The national goals of EU-27 countries will be pre-
dictably important in the process of negotiations with Britain. At the same time, 
the EU is the most important economic partner of Britain. It seems that the loser, 
if withdrawal negotiations get sour, would be Britain. It is therefore important to 
assess the real weight and importance of economic relations between EU-27 and 
its member countries and Britain, and what could really happen with Brexit.
8  According to the Eurostat database, only the Netherlands – and since 2012 also Greece – has 
consistently a lower share of imports from the EU-28 than Great Britain. In the case of exports to 
EU-28, only Malta until 2012 – and Greece in 2012 – had a lower share than Great Britain. Since 
2013, the British share is the lowest in the EU.
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The UK current account with the EU is traditionally in deficit and the deficit 
increased in the last years (ONS 2015). This is entirely due to trade in goods, 
while trade in services shows a surplus for Great Britain, however smaller than 
goods balance. In a sense, this balance depicts also the strengths and weaknesses 
of the two partners.
The UK has a growing trade deficit in goods with nearly all EU countries, 
but this is sizeable with some (Germany, Spain, Belgium, France, and Italy, in 
descending order), due to both decreasing exports (to the Netherlands, France, 
and Belgium) and increasing imports (from Spain, Germany, Italy, and Belgium) 
(ONS 2015; Webb – Keep 2016) (Table 1). The surplus of trade in services is 
mainly due to the increase of exports to Italy, the Netherlands, Ireland and Spain, 
and the decrease of imports from the Netherlands.
However, the importance of the EU for the British economy is great also in 
other fields. EU member countries invest heavily in Great Britain: their share 
Table 1. Sources of imports and exports of the United Kingdom (2014, %)
Country Share of the UK’s imports 
Germany 14.50 
China 9.27 
United States 8.47 
Netherlands 7.74 
France 6.29 
Belgium 4.92 
Italy 4.11 
Norway 4.07 
Spain 3.18 
Ireland 2.81 
Country Share of the UK’s exports
United States 11.66 
Germany 10.92 
Switzerland 7.24 
Netherlands 7.17 
France 5.59 
China 5.07 
Ireland 4.91 
Belgium 4.75 
Russian Federation 3.25 
Spain 3.15
Source: Evenett – Fritz (2016).
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of the accumulated stock of foreign direct investment (FDI), which was 30% in 
1997, increased to 50% in 2014 (Springford et al. 2016).9
The UK international investment position – which includes FDI, portfolio in-
vestments, and other investments – showed a net liability position of £244.0 bil-
lion at the end of 2013, with reported liabilities totalling £9,928.3 billion. Net 
liabilities increased to £454.1 billion at the end of 2014. The share of the total UK 
liabilities to the rest of the world invested by EU member countries was 40.9% 
(ONS 2015).
Particularly important is also the value of UK banks’ assets held in the euro 
zone, which was 45% higher than their US assets in 2015, a disproportionate 
value if one considers that the euro zone economy is around three-quarters the US 
economy (Springford et al. 2016).
The importance of the British economy for non-EU countries is also a major 
issue and concern. These countries – particularly the United States, China, Japan, 
and Russia10 – are deeply concerned for possible negative consequences for their 
economies. While the prolonged deflation dominating the EU is a major problem 
of the world economy, Brexit adds new uncertainties and dangers to an already 
gloomy situation. All these countries have taken some initiative – openly the 
United States, covertly and prudently China and Russia – to convince the Brit-
ish government of the dangers in the referendum first and to look for a fast and 
smooth solution later.
Unexpectedly, it was Japan which took the most open, detailed, and bold 
position. Japan has sizeable interests in the UK and the EU. Japan is not among 
the top traders of the UK, but is the 6th largest single country in terms of in-
9  FDIs represent approximately 13% of the stock of UK assets abroad (£1,267.5 billion at the 
end of 2013 out of total reported assets at £9,684.3 billion). More than one-half of British 
FDIs (52% in 2013) are invested in Europe, mainly in the EU. European FDIs in the UK are 
still more important for the British economy at 58.6% of the total in 2013 and a net balance 
of £56.6 billion. The overall share of the EU is outstanding at 48.1% (ONS 2015). While FDI 
balance showed traditionally a net asset position for the UK, at the end of 2014, a net liability 
position of £148.0 billion was registered for the first time.
10  On the consequences for the United States, see Haass – Fonte (2016): “Be it resolved that: It is 
not in U.S. national interests for the UK to exit the EU.” (Haas is the President of the Council 
on Foreign Relations.) On China, see García-Herrero – Xu (2016), who conclude that the 
short-term impact will be smaller for China than for other regions, although there are impor-
tant considerations further ahead. As to Russia, there may be a trade-off between the negative 
economic and financial impacts of Brexit and the hope that it will help easing European sanc-
tions against Russia (Sushentsov 2016).
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vestment, with 4% of total stock of international investment into the UK.11 
Japanese firms in the EU employ 440,000 people and nearly half of Japanese 
direct investment to the EU flowed to the UK in 2015. In a written message to 
the United Kingdom and the European Union released on September 4, 2016 
(MOFA 2016), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan took the unprecedented 
initiative to detail an excellent analysis of the dangers of Brexit for the interna-
tional economic community and a set of requests coming from Japanese firms 
with interests in Great Britain and elsewhere in the EU. Given the traditional 
prudence of Japanese official organs, the message is surprisingly outspoken, 
which is a clear sign of the international worries that Brexit has caused. Ja-
pan’s position can be taken as representing the view of other non-EU countries 
too. Indeed, Brexit is of general concern and includes dangers for individual 
foreign businesses.12
11  In terms of numbers of investments, the top investors in the UK are United States, France, 
India, and China (including Hong-Kong). The UK attracts the highest number of FDI among 
the EU countries. In value, the top investors are the United States (holding 27% of FDI stock), 
followed by the Netherlands (15%), and France (8%). Globally, the UK is the third largest 
country in terms of its absolute value of inward FDI stock, behind the USA and China (UKTI 
2015).
12  On the former, the message stresses that “Uncertainty is a major concern for an economy. We 
hope that predictability is secured whereby all stakeholders, not just the negotiating parties, 
have a clear idea of the post-BREXIT landscape. This will be possible if the BREXIT negotia-
tions are conducted through an uninterrupted and transparent process, which could include 
arrangements such as the establishment of a provisional period and, if there need to be institu-
tional changes, the granting of time for the transition and publicising of such changes. … It is 
imperative for the UK and the EU to regain the confidence of the world and ensure their unwa-
vering competitiveness by increasing the predictability of the BREXIT process, ensuring the 
outcome is free of unpleasant surprises and reducing the risks emanating from uncertainty.” 
Along with the general problem, the situation is serious for Japanese businesses, various of 
which “have invested actively to the UK, which was seen to be a gateway to Europe, and have 
established value-chains across Europe”. Since any change can jeopardise their situation, the 
Japanese government and firms “strongly request that the UK will consider this fact seriously 
and respond in a responsible manner to minimise any harmful effects on these businesses.” 
Failing to do so may jeopardise the present situation of those Japanese businesses which have 
their bases in the UK to oversee their activities in the EU and lead the message to openly state 
that “Japanese businesses with their European headquarters in the UK may decide to transfer 
their head-office function to Continental Europe if EU laws cease to be applicable in the UK 
after its withdrawal” (MOFA 2016).
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4. FINANCIAL AND FISCAL EFFECTS
Financial and fiscal effects are likely to be more important. In fact, Britain, and 
the City of London in particular, are key players in the international financial 
markets. Not only do they have a superior expertise than other EU member coun-
tries, but the British financial market is truly international and is largely used 
by continental companies and even public organisations. The London Stock Ex-
change (LSE) is the fourth largest stock exchange in the world and the largest 
one in Europe. It is the most international of all the world’s stock exchanges, 
with around 3,000 companies from over 70 countries admitted to trading on its 
markets (Table 2).
Table 2. Stock exchanges (2011) 
Market capitalisation Trade value Listed companies
USD billions
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) 14,242 20,161 8000
NASDAQ OMX 4,687 13,552 3400
Tokyo Stock Exchange 3,325 3,972 2292
London Stock Exchange (LSE) 3,266 2,871 3000
Deutsche Börse (DB)1 1,185 1,758 765
In percent
NYSE/LSE 4,36 7,02 2,67
NYSE/DB 12,02 11,47 10,46
LSE/DB 2,76 1,63 3,92
Source: Own calculations based on World Stock Exchanges (http://www.world-stock-exchanges.net/top10.html)
The attractiveness of financial markets also depends on the fiscal treatment of 
capital. Great Britain has an important advantage in this, being one of the coun-
tries in the world with the most favourable fiscal treatment of capital. According 
to the World Bank,14 only Croatia, Luxembourg, Cyprus, Denmark, Ireland, Bul-
garia, and Slovenia guarantee capital a more favourable general fiscal treatment 
(total tax rate payable by companies). The same can be said regarding corporate 
tax rates: only Bulgaria, Ireland, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovenia, 
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are more attractive than Britain.
However, most of these countries are unable to compete with the expertise, the 
general attractiveness of the British market, and the efficiency and predictability 
of its fiscal system. According to the World Bank Doing Business database15, 
13 DB is the tenth stock exchange market in the world and the second one in the EU.
14  World Development Indicators, http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/5.6
15  http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings
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Britain is 15th in the ranking of paying taxes.16 Among EU member countries, only 
Ireland (6th) and Denmark (12th) do better.
With Brexit, Britain may want to strengthen this significant advantage and ini-
tiate (or better said, strengthen) fiscal competition with the EU, particularly in the 
case of the fiscal treatment of businesses. This may be more a negotiation weapon 
than a real danger, a weapon though that is likely to restrict the EU’s negotiating 
strength in fiscal and other matters, particularly the regulation of capital flows. 
Similar considerations hold in the case of a possible interest rates war or currency 
war. The role of international regulation apart, it is not in the interest of Britain to 
cut interest rates and depreciate the sterling in the long run, because this would 
go against the interest of the British financial community, the most important sec-
tor of the British economy. It would be an entirely different matter if the British 
government decides to promote a policy of the country’s re-industrialisation. In 
this case, a weak sterling would help and the policy would put EU exporters un-
der pressure. Overall, the present easy monetary policy is likely to be a relatively 
short run answer to political and market uncertainty under the blow of the unex-
pected outcome of the referendum. But all this, again, weakens the negotiation 
weapons in the hands of the EU.
The consequences are inevitable also for the EU budget. With Brexit, Great 
Britain will end contribution to the EU budget. The UK is a net contributor to 
the common budget, corresponding to less than 0.5% of its GDP (Dallago 2016). 
Britain has a double problem with this contribution. The first problem is that 
when leaving the EU, Britain will also lose EU financial support to disadvan-
taged regions and subsidies to agriculture. While this may be beneficial to British 
consumers, some regions – notably Wales and Northern Ireland, which are net 
beneficiaries of the EU budget – will suffer. The opportunity to compensate los-
ers, together with the action of the agricultural lobby, may create political and 
fiscal problems.
The second problem is that the EU links the free access to its common mar-
ket to third countries that also contribute financially to the EU. Third countries 
which enjoy free access to the European single market include the countries of 
the European Economic Area (EEA) such as Norway. Switzerland, which is not 
a member of the EEA, has various bilateral agreements with the EU and can thus 
16  Doing Business records the taxes and mandatory contributions that a medium-size company 
must pay in a given year as well as the administrative burden of paying taxes and contribu-
tions. Taxes and contributions measured include the profit or corporate income tax, social 
contributions, and labour taxes paid by the employer, property taxes, property transfer taxes, 
dividend tax, capital gains tax, financial transactions tax, waste collection taxes, vehicle and 
road taxes, and any other small taxes or fees. (http://www.doingbusiness.org/methodology/
paying-taxes).
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participate in the EU market. In exchange for the access to the EU internal mar-
ket, these countries contribute to financing selected programmes to the advantage 
of Eastern European member countries (infrastructure, regional development 
fund, R&D, and training projects). The same rules should apply to the UK if the 
latter wants to keep its access to the EU single market. According to Springford 
et al. (2016), the net UK contribution would fall by 9% (following the Norwegian 
model) or 55% (following the Swiss model).
Along with a financial contribution, the UK should guarantee the free move-
ment of persons from and to the EU,17 together with the free movement of goods, 
services, and capital. Friction between the EU and Great Britain over the issue of 
intra-European migration is already clear. Indeed, migration was one of the major 
issues in the Brexit referendum. Moreover, Britain should continue to adopt part 
of the Law of the European Union.
5. INSTITUTIONAL INDETERMINACY OF BREXIT
Given the great deal of uncertainty over the economic consequences of Brexit, we 
have to turn to institutions and the regulation of withdrawal from the EU to gain 
a better understanding of the economic consequences. Unfortunately, things may 
become even less clear in this perspective.
In fact, one of the main difficulties with Brexit or exit by any member country 
is that the process is largely institutionally undetermined and left in the end to 
negotiations between the interested partners: the EU and its continuing member 
countries on one side, and the withdrawing country on the other side. This event 
is only regulated by a rather generic article of the Lisbon Treaty (the Treaty on 
European Union or TEU).18 The article is quite liberal, since it foresees that any 
17  There are approximately 1.2 million British migrants living in other EU countries, including 
various retired persons, compared with around 3.2 million EU migrants living in the UK, most 
of whom have a job, often a highly specialised job (Hawkins 2016). The national origin of EU 
citizens living in Britain and the destination of British emigrants show remarkable intercoun-
try differences: most immigrants to the UK come from Poland, followed by Ireland, Romania, 
and Portugal. Most British emigrants live in Spain, followed by Ireland and France.
18  Article 50 of the TEU foresees the following: “1. Any Member State. 2. A Member State 
which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council of its intention. In the light of 
the guidelines provided by the European Council, the Union shall negotiate and conclude an 
agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of 
the framework for its future relationship with the Union. That agreement shall be negotiated 
in accordance with Article 218(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
It shall be concluded on behalf of the Union by the Council, acting by a qualified majority, 
after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament. 3. The Treaties shall cease to apply to 
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member country is free to withdraw upon its own decision only (“may decide 
to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own constitutional require-
ments”). Its only duty is to “notify the European Council of its intention”. This 
obviously leaves the initiative entirely in the hands of the exiting member state 
and indirectly strengthens its negotiation position.
Once the notification is received, the negotiation process starts. The EU or-
gan responsible for defining the guidelines of the negotiation process and for 
concluding the negotiation is the European Council, which acts by a qualified 
majority, after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament. Putting the Eu-
ropean Council in charge of negotiations leads to differences among the national 
governments of member states based on their respective national interests.19 The 
importance of this process lies in that it concerns not only the withdrawal proc-
ess, but also the framework for defining the future relations between the EU and 
the withdrawing country (“setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking 
account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union.”).
It is only when the withdrawal agreement enters into force that the EU trea-
ties stop applying to the withdrawing country. Obviously, this creates the curious 
situation that the withdrawing country continues to be part of the EU also during 
the negotiation process. Although it is foreseen that the prime minister of Great 
Britain “shall not participate in the discussions of the European Council or Coun-
cillor in decisions concerning it”, he/she nevertheless may have the possibility to 
influence decision-making from within in all other fields. Indeed, he/she contin-
ues to partake in discussions and decision-making on all other issues, a situation 
which the withdrawing country may exploit to obtain strategic advantages in the 
withdrawal negotiations. In order to circumvent this situation, the EU started to 
use informal meetings such as the one of the European Council in Bratislava on 
September 16, 2016.
the State in question from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing 
that, two years after the notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, 
in agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously decides to extend this period. 4. 
For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 3, the member of the European Council or of the Council 
representing the withdrawing Member State shall not participate in the discussions of the Eu-
ropean Council or Councilor in decisions concerning it. A qualified majority shall be defined 
in accordance with Article 238(3)(b) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
5. If a State which has withdrawn from the Union asks to rejoin, its request shall be subject 
to the procedure referred to in Article 49.” (http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/
BRIE/2016/577971/EPRS_BRI(2016)577971_EN.pdf).
19  The European Council includes the heads of state or government of the member states, the 
President of the European Council (presently Donald Tusk), the President of the European 
Commission (presently Jean-Claude Juncker), and the High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (presently Federica Mogherini).
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Article 50 also foresees the possibility that Brexit does not go through. As a 
matter of fact, the decision to invoke Article 50 is a unilateral act that the UK may 
or may not undertake. This does not depend on what other member states think 
or do. If the agreement on withdrawal is not reached, the Treaties will neverthe-
less cease to apply in the withdrawing country two years after the notification, 
“unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, 
unanimously decides to extend this period.” This is a blurred provision, which 
can leave ample space for strategising. As a matter of fact, the June 23, 2016, 
referendum was a consultative one and “both the UK government and Parliament 
may change their views or may decide to hold a second referendum.” “Nothing 
in Article 50 would then prevent the UK from deciding, in conformity with its 
constitutional requirements, to withdraw its unilateral ‘intention’” (Piris 2016).20 
However, the British government repeatedly made its intention clear to fully im-
plement Brexit. Yet the reality, given the present rules, is that remaining in the 
single market and the customs union will strongly limit Britain’s sovereignty in 
regulating the movement of labour and the possibility to negotiate bilateral trade 
deals with third countries. Withdrawing from these arrangements will disrupt 
British participation in multinational supply chains.
There is an ongoing debate about what will happen. The EU showed its irrita-
bility in front of an unforeseen and unwanted event (regret, respect, and resolve 
was the typical phrasing in Brussels and national capital cities), but soon gained 
control of its political and institutional nerves. Intense open and hidden diplo-
matic activity is taking place. Different countries have different opinions based 
on different national interests and diverse views of the integration process. But 
the initiative is in the hands of the British government.21
Brexit is clearly a major political defeat for the EU, an outcome that sees the 
Union institutionally unprepared. This may not be an insurmountable problem, 
though, since the Union had weathered several integration crises, which gave the 
necessary impetus to go ahead and find ad hoc solutions. Yet this time it may be 
different.
So far, crises were caused by clashes of interests among member countries 
(the most famous being Gaullist France’s empty seat and Thatcher’s “I want my 
money back!”), or unforeseen events (the most prominent being the international 
financial crisis). This time, it is a prominent member country which decided to 
leave the Union. This is not a “simple” clash of interest among member coun-
20  Piris is a former director-general of the Council of the European Union’s Legal Service.
21  The turmoil apparently dominating British currency and financial markets in fall 2016 
stress that there may be a contrast between the British government and the British financial 
community over the approach to Brexit.
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tries willing to remain part of the club, as was the hypothetical case of Grexit. 
This time, it is a genuine divorce. Knowing where a divorce leads is never easy, 
particularly so if the institutional and procedural frameworks are blurred or in-
complete.
Since Brexit is a political defeat for the European Union, the real issue hence-
forth is to understand whether this setback can be transformed in an economic 
and institutional opportunity. Great Britain took the initiative and chose to go in 
a new direction, and the British government seems to have a rather clear vision 
(Davis 2016), although the clarity may be more about what the British govern-
ment desires than on what is reasonably possible (Stephens 2016).22 The EU was 
caught by surprise and is presently uncertain as to how to proceed. One thing is 
22  British Secretary of State David Davis, in charge of negotiations for exiting the European 
Union, in a statement to the Parliament on September 5, 2016, gave a rather clear picture of 
British approach to Brexit (Davis 2016). Brexit “is a national mandate and this government is 
determined to deliver it in the national interest. … there will be no attempt to stay in the EU by 
the back door. … It means getting the best deal for Britain – one that is unique to Britain and 
not an ‘off the shelf’ solution. This must mean controls on the numbers of people who come 
to Britain from Europe – but also a positive outcome for those who wish to trade in goods and 
services. … we do not see Brexit as ending our relationship with Europe. It is about starting a 
new one. We want to maintain or even strengthen our co-operation on security and defence. It 
is in the interests of both the UK and the EU that we have the freest possible trading relation-
ship. We want a strong EU, succeeding economically and politically, working with Britain in 
many areas of common interest. …Negotiating with the EU will have to be got right. We are 
going to take the time needed to get it right. We are going to take the time needed to get it 
right. And we will strive to build a national consensus around our approach. … And so, as we 
proceed, we will be guided by some clear principles. First, as I said, we wish to build a na-
tional consensus around our position. Second, while always putting the national interest first, 
we will always act in good faith towards our European partners. Third, wherever possible we 
will try to minimise any uncertainty that change can inevitably bring. And, fourth, crucially, 
we will – by the end of this process – have left the European Union, and put the sovereignty 
and supremacy of this Parliament beyond doubt. … Finally, we are determined to ensure that 
people have as much stability and certainty in the period leading up to our departure from 
the EU. Until we leave the European Union, we must respect the laws and obligations that 
membership requires of us. We also want to ensure certainty when it comes to public funding. 
… structural and investment fund projects signed before the Autumn Statement and research 
and innovation projects financed by the European Commission granted before we leave the 
EU will be underwritten by the Treasury … after we leave. Agriculture is a vital part of the 
economy, and the government will match the current level of annual payments that the sector 
receives through the direct payment scheme until 2020, providing certainty. In terms of the 
position of EU nationals in the UK, the Prime Minister … is determined to protect the status 
of EU nationals already living here, and the only circumstances in which that would not be 
possible is if British citizens’ rights in European member states were not protected in return – 
something that I find hard to imagine.” Yet this picture is still quite general, full of desiderata 
and rhetoric, and perhaps not fully in tune with the reality.
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clear amidst the great uncertainty and serious dangers for the sustainability of 
European integration: the challenge is clearly the greatest one the EU has faced 
so far. The way this challenge will be approached and the solutions given to it 
will determine the future of the Union for the decades ahead, be it towards its 
strengthening or its melting.
6. PREPARING TO NEGOTIATE
The outcome of the referendum was a surprise and a shock for all international 
agencies and governments also outside of the EU. The IMF, in an update of the 
World Economic Outlook released in mid-July (IMF 2016), writes that the out-
come surprised global financial markets and caused an important downside risk 
for the world economy.
Quite clearly, the EU was hit the hardest. In a joint statement released the day 
after the referendum (Schulz et al. 2016), the four Presidents of the EU (European 
Parliament, European Council, Council of the EU, and European Commission) 
stressed that “The Union of 27 Member States will continue.” They also ask 
that the UK government proceed “to give effect to this decision of the British 
people as soon as possible, however painful that process may be.” While the EU 
is “ready to launch negotiations swiftly with the United Kingdom regarding the 
terms and conditions of its withdrawal from the European Union”, the statement 
also warns that “Until this process of negotiations is over, the United Kingdom 
remains a member of the European Union, with all the rights and obligations that 
derive from this. According to the Treaties which the United Kingdom has rati-
fied, EU law continues to apply to the full to and in the United Kingdom until it 
is no longer a Member.”
These statements are formally correct but appear to reveal the danger that this 
process hides for the cohesion of the EU. While the statement notes that “we hope 
to have it [the UK] as a close partner of the European Union in the future”, speed 
is fundamental for curbing uncertainty. In a similar vein, commissioner Neven 
Mimica (2016) makes the point particularly clear: “The European Union is faced 
with a crisis that is more existential than the Greece and migration crises taken 
together. We are to undergo an unplanned, unique stress-test.”
It is certainly so, not least owing to the economic, political, and military power 
of Britain and its privileged relation to the United States, which led various of-
ficers and national politicians in the EU to express “regret, respect, and resolve” 
on the outcome of the referendum. This approach may be unfair, in particular if 
one considers the lack of regret and respect towards Greece in summer 2015 and 
how badly immigration was mismanaged. Yet realpolitik requires that a differ-
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ent approach is taken in the case of Britain. But which approach? Commissioner 
Mimica rules out a comprehensive approach in the federalist perspective: “the 
outcome of the UK referendum should not lead us to new institutional reforms, 
a new Convention, new Treaty renegotiations, new calls for more Europe or a 
federal Europe.” The explanation is that the EU should not feed anti-EU populists 
and extremists, or provide them with new arguments. On the contrary: the best 
response would be “forging in ‘better Europe’ reforms”.
Perhaps. But this position hides the danger of negotiating with a determined 
partner from an unstable and worsening position.
7. CONCLUSIONS
What, then, should we expect from Brexit? Apparently, economic indeterminacy 
and institutional uncertainty. Economic and political experts, international or-
ganisations, and the business community have advanced different predictions that 
emphasise the indeterminacy of the outcomes. Typically, three scenarios are pre-
sumed: a pessimistic scenario, an optimistic scenario, and a more balanced one. 
The probability attached to each scenario depends on both the British and EU 
attitude and policies, and on external circumstances. Yet none of them, except the 
generic and unproved statements by the initiators of Brexit, foresees a positive 
outcome for both the EU and Britain (Bond et al. 2016; CPE 2016; Dhingra et al. 
2016; Giles 2016; Gow – Meyer 2016; IMF 2016; Irwin 2015; Kierzen kowski et 
al. 2016; OE 2016; PwC 2016; Springford – Tilford 2014; Springford et al. 2016; 
Webb – Keep 2016).
There is an overwhelming concern for what is expected to happen in the UK, 
much less in the EU-27. This is in part due to the fact that most analyses originate 
in Britain and are motivated by the necessity to prepare countermeasures before 
leaving the EU. At the same time, analyses also had the not-so-hidden aim to con-
vince voters to choose to remain. However, part of the explanation lies also in the 
fact that the EU as a whole elicits less attention than in the past and its situation 
is too blurred to allow for reliable forecasts.
Generally, a rather pessimistic mood prevails: expectations are that economic 
consequences could be negative for Britain and mildly negative for the EU. This 
means that most scholars, experts, and observers contend that EU membership 
was beneficial to Britain, while British membership was mildly beneficial to 
the EU. For instance, a recent OECD study (Kierzenkowski et al. 2016) finds 
that living standards (measured as real GDP per capita in constant purchasing 
power parities) in the UK have risen more since it entered the EU in 1973 than 
UK “peers” (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States). The same 
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OECD report concludes that “UK exit (Brexit) would be a major negative shock 
to the UK economy, with economic fallout in the rest of the OECD, particularly 
other European countries. In some respects, Brexit would be akin to a tax on 
GDP, imposing a persistent and rising cost on the economy that would not be 
incurred if the UK remained in the EU. The shock would be transmitted through 
several channels that would change depending on the time horizon.”
It is also expected that the prevailing business and political uncertainty over 
the outcome of Brexit would have particularly negative consequences for the EU 
member countries in the economically and financially most difficult situation, no-
tably Italy, Portugal, Greece, and perhaps Spain. It is noteworthy that the econom-
ic ties of these countries with Great Britain are well below the level of economic 
ties between Great Britain with Germany, the Netherlands, or France. It seems 
that the most worrying effect of Brexit is business and financial uncertainty.
Overall, while costs for Britain exist and may represent a problematic perspec-
tive for the country, the advantages of Brexit are typically considered mild or 
even illusory. Scholars and observers believe that the balance of Brexit between 
advantages and costs is negative, although it is hard to quantify. A different opin-
ion is that Brexit may turn out to be beneficial for the EU. This opinion is based 
on the negative role that the UK has played in the EU in undermining integration 
and slowing down or blocking cohesion: “it is not in the interest of the EU to keep 
a country in the union that will continue to be hostile to ‘l’acquis communautaire’ 
and that will follow a strategy to further undermine it. … When Britain is kept out 
of the EU it will no longer be able to undermine the EU’s cohesion. The EU will 
come out stronger” (De Grauwe 2016).
One is left with the impression that once negotiations are through, nothing 
much will change. As one report puts it, Brexit “would be economically costly 
– and the best way to mitigate those costs would be to ensure that the economic 
relationship between the UK and the EU replicates membership of the single 
market as closely as possible.” As a consequence, the final outcome may be that 
Britain will be left with “EU regulation without representation’” (Springford et 
al. 2016). The first data on the UK’s economic performance and business climate 
apparently show that not much changed, apart from the 10% depreciation of the 
sterling (Pickard – Cadman 2016). However, this may just be a momentary situ-
ation. The critical moment will be the exit from the single market, after which 
losses will become evident, with business holding back on investment, foreign 
investors leaving the country, public finances worsening, and living standards 
falling due to the sterling depreciation (Gros 2016; Stephens 2016). 
More importantly, the British government seems to be fairly in control of the 
process and proceeding rapidly to set up the complex machine that will lead Great 
Britain out of the EU. It also appears to have worked out a clear and shared exit 
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strategy, and is starting to work on the particular components and steps. However, 
this is the easy part of the job, with the most important issues – primarily the 
single market and the customs union – still unsettled. The reaction by markets to 
that determination in fall 2016 suggests that that the government’s control over 
processes may be far less firm than leavers think.
As for the EU, it is clearly under stress. It is true that according to article 50, 
the initiative must be taken by Britain. Yet the EU still has the fundamental issues 
unsolved. While the Chief Negotiator, Michel Barnier, has been appointed, he 
started his new office only in October. The general circumstances of his job are 
still ill-defined, as much as his staff is. In particular, it is unclear what his effec-
tive role will be: will the Chief Negotiator have full negotiation power or will his 
role be submitted to the approval by member countries (at least through the Euro-
pean Council)? Will this approval be pre-emptive, before the agreement with the 
British counterpart is reached, or will it be on the draft agreement reached by the 
two parties? In case of disagreements, who will deal with the Chief Negotiator: 
the President of the European Commission who appointed him or the European 
Council? And what will be the role of the European Parliament? The feeling is 
that these issues may remain unsettled for a long time, weakening the EU nego-
tiation position.
The problem with the EU is that there are too many different and perhaps 
divergent interests and, most important, it lacks a shared project of further inte-
gration amidst incomplete and asymmetric common institutions. Brexit has re-
vealed the fundamental flaws of the integration process, which remained halfway 
between a supranational project and a kind of inter-governmental construction. 
Minimising the EU agenda, as Commissioner Mimica suggests (“forging in ‘bet-
ter Europe’ reforms”), may make the EU’s task easier, but will inevitably weaken 
its negotiation position and fail to solve the fundamental problems of the integra-
tion process.
Negotiating with a smart, skilled, and determined partner, as Britain is, with 
an unsound and blurred domestic basis is usually the best way towards failure. 
Under these conditions, the UK has excellent chances to obtain what it wants, 
also to the disadvantage of the EU interests. Yet, now that Britain is getting out, 
there is an excellent possibility to clarify some fundamental issues on the future 
of the EU.
The present economic and institutional muddling through that prevails in the 
EU, made up of keeping the old convergence criteria, rules and policies while 
softening their implementation, may be understandable and even wise in the short 
run (Dallago 2016). However, it is dangerous in the long run and may lead to 
further disruption. It is clear that the present situation is dangerous and unsustain-
able in the long run because of the deep economic and social faults it is causing 
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within the EU. Brexit offers an important opportunity to rethink the EU. This goal 
should get priority over the management of Brexit and should also dictate the 
terms and timing of the EU negotiation. While apparently this would weaken the 
EU negotiation, it could actually strengthen the EU position by curbing the temp-
tation to manage Brexit according to national interests and keeping the UK at bay. 
More importantly, when the existent settlement jeopardises the future of the EU, 
as it does, using an external challenge such as Brexit to find a better solution may 
be the best opportunity around.23 Even if there may be costs to be paid.
The latest developments give rise to both hopes and fears. Clearly, EU officers 
and national governments are aware of the dangers, although an attempt by some 
national governments to exploit the present uncertainty to their own advantage is 
also present. The European Commission is apparently the most determined in pur-
suing a strategic agenda of revamping the process of integration, subordinating – 
correctly in my view – the management of Brexit to this goal.24 In his recent “State 
of the Union Address 2016” (Juncker 2016), President Juncker admitted that “Our 
European Union is, at least in part, in an existential crisis. … Never before have 
I seen so much fragmentation, and so little commonality in our Union.” To invert 
this dangerous trend, he proposes “a positive agenda of concrete European actions 
for the next twelve months. … the next twelve months are decisive if we want to 
23  The position of the presidents of the French and the German central banks recently expressed 
is particularly clear in this sense and can be easily shared (Villeroy de Galhau – Weidmann 
2016). Important is the position of the president of the ECB, Mario Draghi (2016). Draghi 
stresses the dramatic necessity to revive the process of integration, which “needs to be guided 
towards outcomes that are more efficient and more directly aimed at the people, their needs 
and their fears”. This requires a better defined role of the EU and of national governments, 
taking action in the case of the most urgent problems (including migration, security, and de-
fence), devote more attention to growth, and the redistributive aspects of integration (“policies 
that unleash growth, reduce unemployment and empower individuals, while offering essential 
protections for the most vulnerable”), completing European institutions. An interesting pro-
posal comes from Pisani-Ferry et al. (2016), who propose a continental partnership, which 
would allow Britain to participate in goods, services, capital mobility, and some temporary 
labour mobility. The UK would have a say on EU policies, but ultimate formal authority 
would remain with the EU. This would create a new system of inter-governmental decision 
making and enforcement of common rules to protect the homogeneity of the deeply integrated 
market managed in a two-circle Europe: an inner circle, the EU, and an outer circle, the UK 
and perhaps in time other countries such as Turkey, with less integration. This would lead the 
EU to nearly justify Brexit ex-post, but the proposal makes sense provided that the euro zone 
proceeds toward a stronger integration.
24  “Though the outcome of the referendum in the UK affects us all, it must not dominate our 
agenda for the next years. We have a positive reform agenda in front to us to strengthen our 
Union, to respond forcefully to the challenges of our times and to create a better Europe that 
empowers and protects citizens where needed. We must move ahead and act effectively with 
a sense of urgency, determination and above all unity.” (Juncker – Timmermans 2016).
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reunite our Union.” Three proposals are particularly important in the economic 
field: the introduction of a new European Fund for Strategic Investments that the 
European Parliament already supported and adopted, whose duration and financial 
capacity will be doubled; to accelerate the establishment of the Capital Markets 
Union; and “implement the Stability and Growth Pact with common sense”.25
The “State of the Union Address”, released on September 14, 2016, was fol-
lowed by the Bratislava Declaration on September 16, 2016. The informal meet-
ing of the European Council in Bratislava was the first without the participation 
of the British prime minister.26 There were worries and intercountry tensions be-
fore and during the meeting. Yet the 27 member countries came to an agreement 
on a “Bratislava roadmap” that includes some novelties and progress, and tries 
to move beyond Brexit. The roadmap presents a work programme in 5 points 
(“I. General diagnosis and objective, II. Migration and external borders, III. In-
ternal and external security, IV. Economic and social development, youth, V. Way 
ahead”), along the lines of the “State of the Union Address”. It attempts to define 
a fast reaction to the most pressing political and social challenges, and to move 
towards a better coordination between the EU organs and national governments. 
Overall, the impression is that the EU wants to become less technocratic and more 
pragmatic and realistic. The priority is given to the solution of the most pressing 
problems by promoting a better coordination among national governments, with 
the European Commission taking the initiative, but not ruling (“Need to be clear 
about what the EU can do, and what is for the Member States to do, to make sure 
we can deliver on our promises.”)
25  The latter may not mean a revolution, but promises a more comprehensive and transparent 
approach to convergence: “The Pact’s creation was influenced by theory. Its application has 
become a doctrine for many. And today, the Pact is a dogma for some. In theory, a single 
decimal point over 60 percent in a country’s debt should be punished. But in reality, you have 
to look at the reasons for debt. We should try to support and not punish ongoing reform ef-
forts. For this we need responsible politicians. And we will continue to apply the Pact not in a 
dogmatic manner, but with common sense and with the flexibility that we wisely built into the 
rules.” (Juncker 2016). This is still muddling through, but it may intend to give a better man-
aged, less episodic approach to a reasonable management of rules. The emphasis on reforms 
is important, although excessively generic.
26  “Today we meet in Bratislava at a critical time for our European project. The Bratislava Sum-
mit of 27 Member States has been devoted to diagnose together the present state of the Euro-
pean Union and discuss our common future. … Although one country has decided to leave, 
the EU remains indispensable for the rest of us. … We are determined to make a success of 
the EU with 27 Member States, building on this joint history.” (European Council 2016b). At 
the press conference following the Bratislava summit on September 16, 2016, Donald Tusk 
(2016), President of the European Council, stated: “Our assessment is sober but not defeatist. 
… we are determined to correct the past mistakes and move on with common solutions as the 
EU of 27. We will not continue business as usual.”
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Overall, the climate after Brexit is sober because external and internal prob-
lems are daunting and time is not on the side of a motionless EU. The Brexit sur-
prise is fading away, but the problems remain. Yet there are hopes and signs that 
the EU is not giving up and is perhaps moving to a new, promising approach, less 
sensitive to formal rules, less hostage to the lack of mutual trust, and more open 
to problem management and solution finding. Although the EU took a clearer 
position on some fundamental issues such as migration and security, in the eco-
nomic field this approach is still too generic. It is generic on policies and criteria, 
and fails to clearly stress the fundamental issue of institutional reforms at both 
national and EU level.
This approach is not the resolution of what has so far prevented a more effec-
tive integration and a viable monetary and economic union, but may be a step in 
that direction. The future will decide whether this is done in time. If so, Brexit is 
the shock that was needed to start putting petty, short-sighted national questions 
aside, placing convergence criteria in a long-term perspective, and concentrating 
on the institutional and structural problems of integration, be they common or 
national. This is at least the hope of all those who believe that the EU is a funda-
mental value for our lives in the present and the future.
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